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Abstract
Bumb and Hoede have shown that a cooperative game can be split
into two games, the reward game and the fine game, by considering
the sign of quantities cvS in the c-diagram of the game. One can then
define a solution x for the original game as x = xr − xf , where xr is
a solution for the reward game and xf is a solution for the fine game.
Due to the distinction of cooperation rewards and fines, for allocating
the fines one may use another solution concept than for the rewards.
In this paper, fine vectors are introduced and a solution mapping
for fine games is defined. We discuss the structure and properties of
this mapping and show how the solution set is related to the Shapley
value, the core and the Weber set. We also characterize the mapping as
the unique mapping satisfying axioms of Efficiency, Pseudo-symmetry,
Dummy Player Property and Additivity.
Key Words: c-diagram, fine games, fine vectors, solution mapping.
AMS classification: 91A44.
1 Introduction and fine games
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N
is a nonempty, finite set and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function, defined
on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation:
i ∈ N) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2N with
S 6= ∅) are called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated real
number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is
denoted by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N .
A solution vector of an n-person TU-game is an n-dimensional vector
giving a payoff to any player i ∈ N . A solution function is a function x that
assigns a solution vector x(v) ∈ Rn to any game 〈N, v〉. A solution function
x is efficient if for any game the total payoff it assigns to the players is equal
to the worth v(N) of the grand coalition, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi(v) = v(N) for any n-
players game v ∈ V , where V denotes the set of all cooperative games. Most
of the proposed solution concepts meet the individual rationality principle
which requires xi(v) ≥ v(i). An example of an efficient solution function is
the Shapley value, and the value meets the individual rationality principle
(see Shapley [9]), being the weighted average of so-called marginal value
vectors.
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A solution mapping is a mapping Ψ that assigns to every game 〈N, v〉
a set of solution vectors in Rn. Well-known solution mappings are the core
and the Weber set.
Given the player set N , with every subset S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅, there is associ-
ated its unanimity game 〈N,uS〉 defined by
uS(T ) =
{
1, if S ⊆ T ;
0, otherwise.
From the theory of cooperative games, one knows that any cooperative game
〈N, v〉 can be represented as a linear combination of the characteristic func-
tions of the unanimity games. To be exact, it is well-known that
v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T,S 6=∅
cvS · uS , where c
v
S =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T ) for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
The quantities cvS are widely used in the theory of cooperative games.
Recall that one of the classical proofs for the Shapley value satisfying four ax-
ioms, namelyefficiency, anonymity, dummy player and additivity is done by
using the above expression (see [9]). And, Harsanyi defined
cvS
|S| as dividends
(see [6], [7]). Based on the definition, the solution set named Harsanyi set
and related concepts have been introduced independently by Vasil’ev [11],
[12], [13] and [14], and by Hammer, Peled and Sorensen [5]. Recently this
set of solutions has been discussed by Derks, Haller and Peters [3] as the so-
called selectope. The quantities cvS also proved to be essential in establishing
the connection between set games and cooperative games (see [1]).
First, let us recall several results already stated in the papers of Bumb
and Hoede (see [2]). They used the Hasse diagram to indicate the values of
the coalitions in the cooperative game as well as the associated numbers cvS ,
see Figure 1 (Note that we have written cS for c
v
S).
v123
v12 v13 v23
v1 v2 v3
0
c123
c12 c13 c23
c1 c2 c3
0
Figure 1: v-diagram and c-diagram of a 3-players cooperative game
Note that the sum of the numbers cS equals v123. Restriction of the c-
diagram to subsets of a coalition S determines a sub-c-diagram with numbers
that sum up to vS , i.e. v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
cS . For example, c13 + c1 + c3 = v13.
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Example 1 Consider the following 3-players game.
5
3 3 3
1 2 3
0
2
0 -1 -2
1 2 3
0
v: c:=⇒
The cvS can be interpreted as a cooperation bonus or reward in case
cvS ≥ 0 or as a cooperation malus or fine in case the inequality in the other
direction. Bumb and Hoede separated the c-diagram into two c-diagrams,
one only having nonnegative numbers and another only having nonpositive
numbers in the diagrams. As a c-diagram determines a v-diagram, i.e., a
game, it means that in a natural way one can split the game into two games;
the reward game and the fine game now.
For Example 1, we can split the c-diagram into two c-diagrams cr and
cf .
2
0 0 0
1 2 3
0
0
0 1 2
0 0 0
0
cr: −cf :
and the reward game and the fine game are
8
3 4 5
1 2 3
0
3
0 1 2
0 0 0
0
vr: vf :
where the minus signs have been omitted.
So when we discuss the fine game and its solution concept, both vf (S)
and c
vf
S should be considered to be nonnegative numbers.
A game 〈N, v〉 is convex if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for all
S, T ⊆ N . By splitting a game v into a reward game vr and a fine game vf ,
both with c-diagrams containing non-negative numbers we have
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Theorem 1.1 The reward game vr and the fine game vf are convex games.
Proof: We only prove this for the fine game, a similar proof can be given
for the reward game. For all S, T ⊆ N , let Q = S ∩ T .
vf (S) + vf (T ) =
∑
R⊆S
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆T
c
vf
R
=
∑
R⊆S\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂S
c
vf
R +
∑
S\Q⊂R⊆S
c
vf
R
+
∑
R⊆T\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂T
c
vf
R +
∑
T\Q⊂R⊆T
c
vf
R
≤
∑
R⊆S\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂S
c
vf
R +
∑
S\Q⊂R⊆S
c
vf
R
+
∑
R⊆T\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂T
c
vf
R +
∑
T\Q⊂R⊆T
c
vf
R
+
∑
S⊂R⊂S∪T
c
vf
R +
∑
T⊂R⊆S∪T
c
vf
R
=
∑
R⊆(S\Q)∪(T\Q)∪Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R
=
∑
R⊆S∪T
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆S∩T
c
vf
R
= vf (S ∪ T ) + vf (S ∩ T ).
Theorem 1.1 shows that any game 〈N, v〉 can be split into two convex
games, the reward game and the fine game. Being a convex game is impor-
tant in game theory because of its good properties. Let xr be a solution for
the reward game and let xf be a solution for the fine game. One can then
allocate for the original game x = xr − xf . Designing a solution concept
may be seen as deciding on how the cooperation rewards and cooperation
fines should be allocated. The fair way to split a cooperation reward for
some coalition, seems to split the reward into equal parts and allocate them
to each of the members of the coalition. This would mean using the Shapley
value for the reward game. Due to the distinction of cooperation rewards
and fines, in fact for allocating the fines one may use another solution con-
cept than for the rewards.
In this paper, we concentrate on solutions and their properties for fine
games, so v always means a fine game and Vf denotes the set of all fine
games if no confusion can occur. In Section 2 fine vectors are introduced
and the solution set for fine games is defined. We discuss the structure and
properties of this mapping and show how the solution set is related to the
Shapley value, the core and the Weber set. In Section 3 we characterize
the mapping as the unique mapping satisfying axioms of Efficiency, Pseudo-
symmetry, Dummy Player Property and Additivity.
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2 A solution set defined by fine vectors
There are many solution concepts proposed in the literature of cooperative
games. All of them are given different ways for sharing the worth of all
coalitions v(T ), T ⊆ N . In terms of the cvS ’s a solution concept may be a
rather complex expression. However, any efficient solution distributes v(N)
over the n players. As v(N) =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
cvS any such solution can be written
as
xi =
∑
S⊆N
λS,ic
v
S . (1)
This simply expresses that in efficient games every player i gets a certain
share of each cvS .
The cvS can be interpreted as a cooperation bonus or reward in case
cvS ≥ 0 or as a cooperation malus or fine in case they are nonpositive. Then
(1) can be seen as distributing cooperation rewards and fines.
In case λS,i =
1
n
, for each S and i, every player gets the same, namely
v(N)
n
. This allocation is called the egalitarian value. But if only for player 1
we have λS,1 = 1 while λS,i = 0 for all i, i 6= 1, the allocation can be called
the unfair value.
Solutions may therefore be studied or classified by considering the pos-
sibilities for λS,i. The well-known Shapley value is a solution concept where
the allocation is according to λS,i =
1
s
, for all i ∈ S, and the allocation has
an extremely simple expression in terms of the cvS .
The members of the coalitions with negative cvS should assume respon-
sibility for the fines. For allocating the fines or for deciding on the λS,i, the
fine vectors ~fN = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) are introduced to describe the weight of
responsibility for the fines.
Definition 1 For a fine game, the vector ~fN = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) has the
following properties: (i) 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 and (ii)
∑
i∈N
fi = 1.
We will denote the set of fine vectors as
F
n = { ~fN
∣∣0 ≤ fi ≤ 1, ∑
i∈N
fi = 1}.
Given the set Fn of fine vectors, a solution mapping set Φ : Vf → R
n for
fine games is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Let f(S) =
∑
i∈S
fi. The solution vector φ
~f := Φ(v) of a fine
game is
φ
~f
i =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS ,
~f ∈ Fn,
where
cvS =
∑
T⊆S,T 6=∅
(−1)s−tv(T ), v(∅) = 0.
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In Definition 2, the quotient fi
f(S) may be undefined in case f(S) = 0,
and therewith fi = 0 for all i ∈ S. So we assume that fi = 0 only if i
does not belong to any S for which cvS > 0. The term
fi
f(S)c
v
S is then still
undefined, with also cvS = 0. We will define such a term to be zero.
Theorem 2.1 The solution vector φ
~f of a fine game can be expressed by
marginal contributions as:
φ
~f
i =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T )mi(T ), where mi(T ) = v(T )− v(T \ i) and
fi(T ) =
∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t
fi
f(S)
.
Proof:
φ
~f
i =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
( fi
f(S)
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T )
)
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
( ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(−1)s−tv(T ) +
∑
T⊂S,T 63i
(−1)s−tv(T )
)
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
[ ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(
(−1)s−tv(T ) + (−1)s−t−1v(T \ i)
)]
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
[ ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(−1)s−t
(
v(T )− v(T \ i)
)]
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
( ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(−1)s−tmi(T )
)
∗
=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
mi(T )
( ∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t
fi
f(S)
)
=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T )mi(T ).
The equality (∗) holds because the marginal contribution mi(T ) must be
included by all coalitions S(S ⊇ T ) and appears as (−1)s−t fi
f(S) ·mi(T ).
Lemma 2.2
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T ) = 1.
Proof: ∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T ) =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
∑
S⊇T
(−1)s−t
fi
f(S)
.
Fix coalition S and choose T ⊆ N. The number of coalitions T for which
i ∈ T ⊆ S, so 1 ≤ t ≤ s, is
(
s−1
t−1
)
. Therefore
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T ) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
s∑
t=1
(−1)s−t
(
s− 1
t− 1
)
k=t−1
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
s−1∑
k=0
(−1)s−k−1
(
s− 1
k
)
1k
6
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
(
(−1) + 1
)s−1
.
For s ≥ 2 the contribution is 0. For s = 1, f(S) = fi and the contribution
is 1, as follows directly from the first expression.
A game is called inessential if v(S) =
∑
i∈S v(i) for any S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
For an inessential fine game mi(T ) = v(T ) − v(T \ i) = v(i). Then, by
Lemma 2.2, φ
~f
i = mi(T ) = v(i).
For ~f = ( 1
n
, 1
n
, · · · , 1
n
) Definition 2 gives φ
~f
i =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
s
cvS , which is the
Shapley value. The more familiar expression for this value is confirmed by
Lemma 2.3 If ~f = ( 1
n
, 1
n
, · · · , 1
n
), then fi(T ) =
(t−1)!(n−t)!
n! .
Proof:
fi(T ) =
∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t
fi
f(S)
=
∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t
1
s
=
n∑
s=t
(−1)s−t
1
s
(
n− t
s− t
)
k=s−t
n−t∑
k=0
(−1)k
1
k + t
(
n− t
k
)
=
n−t∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
n− t
k
)∫ 1
0
xk+t−1dx
=
∫ 1
0
n−t∑
k=0
(−1)kxk+t−1
(
n− t
k
)
dx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1
n−t∑
k=0
(−x)k
(
n− t
k
)
1n−t−kdx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1(1− x)n−tdx.
We now let f ′ = (1−x)n−t, g = xt−1, and use
∫
f ′g = fg−
∫
fg′, repeatedly.
This leads to
fi(T ) = −
1
n− t+ 1
(1− x)n−t+1xt−1
∣∣∣1
0
−
∫ 1
0
−1
n− t+ 1
(1− x)n−t+1dxt−1
=
t− 1
n− t+ 1
∫ 1
0
(1− x)n−t+1(x)t−2dx
= · · ·
=
(t− 1)(t− 2) · · · 1
(n− t+ 1)(n− t+ 2) · · · (n− 1)
·
∫ 1
0
(1− x)n−1(x)0dx
=
(t− 1)!
(n− t+ 1)(n− t+ 2) · · · (n− 1)
·
∫ 1
0
−(1− x)n−1d(1− x)
=
(t− 1)!
(n− t+ 1)(n− t+ 2) · · · (n− 1)n
· −(1− x)n
∣∣∣1
0
=
(t− 1)!(n − t)!
n!
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For a game 〈N, v〉, the set I(v) of imputations is the set of all individually
rational payoff vectors that efficiently distribute the payoff v(N) of the grand
coalition amongst its members, i.e.,
I(v) = {x ∈ Rn
∣∣x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v(i), i ∈ N}.
and the core, introduced in game theory by Gillies [4], is the solution map-
ping C : V → Rn defined by
C(v) = {x ∈ I(v)
∣∣x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
It is well-known that the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core when
v is convex, see Shapley [10] and Ichiishi [8].
The Weber mapping, see Weber [15], is the solution defined as the convex
hull of the marginal value vectors, i.e.
W (v) = Conv{mpi(v)
∣∣pi ∈ Π}.
where Π is the set of all permutations on N . Furthermore, it is known that
C(v) = W (v) when v is convex.
Lemma 2.4 Let φ
~f be a solution of a fine game defined by fine vector ~f ,
then
φ
~f ∈ C(v) = W (v).
Proof: By Theorem 1.1, C(v) = W (v) is obvious. For 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 and c
v
S
nonnegative we have
φ
~f
i =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS ≥
fi
fi
cvi = v(i). (a)
φ
~f (N) =
∑
i∈N
φ
~f
i =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS
=
∑
S∈N
∑
i∈S
fi
f(S)
cvS =
∑
S∈N
cvS = v(N). (b)
φ
~f (T ) =
∑
i∈T
φ
~f
i =
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS
≥
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊆T,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS =
∑
S⊆T
∑
i∈S
fi
f(S)
cvS
=
∑
S⊆T
cvS = v(T ). (c)
From (a) and (b), the solution φ
~f is individually rational and efficient, so
φ
~f ∈ I(v), and then φ
~f ∈ C(v) follows for (c).
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3 Axiomatization of the solution set
In this section we provide an axiomatization of the solution mapping set
Φ : Vf → R
n defined by fine vectors, i.e., the value mapping assigning the
solution set Φ(v) to any fine game 〈N, v〉. To do so, first we state four
reasonable axioms to be satisfied by a value mapping Ψ : Vf → R
n.
Axiom System A
1. A value mapping Ψ has the Efficiency property when for any fine game
v ∈ Vf holds
∑
i∈N
ψi(v) = v(N) .
2. A value mapping Ψ has the Pseudo-symmetry property, if for any
fine game v ∈ Vf and any permutation pi : N → N with piv ∈ Vf :
ψ
pi(~f)
pi(i) (piv) = ψ
~f
i (v). This means that any permutation of N should
keep the same proportion of values in the solution vector.
3. A value mapping Ψ has the Dummy Player property, if for any fine
game v ∈ Vf and any dummy player i ∈ N , ψi(v) = v(i). Here player
i is called a dummy in the game 〈N, v〉 if v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v(i), for
all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
4. A value mapping Ψ has the Additivity property, if for any fine game v
and u, Ψ(v + u) = Ψ(v) + Ψ(u).
Axiom 2 was introduced because we wanted to give axioms in terms
of the coalition worths v(S). In terms of the cvS , another property can
be demanded to fix the solution concept, once Additivity, Dummy Player
property and Efficiency property have reduced the possibilities to those of
dividing cvS over the players belonging to coalition S. For the Shapley value
the Equal Treatment property can be considered, stating that φi(v) = φj(v)
when players i and j determine the same marginal values for all coalitions S
to which they are added. On the level of elementary games this implies that
each player i, i ∈ S, is allocated
cv
S
s
. The allocation according to a fine vector
might be called the Proportional Treatment property. In terms of coalition
worths v(S) this property is not easily formulated. Hence our choice of the
Pseudo-symmetry property.
Theorem 3.1 The solution mapping Φ : Vf → R
n for fine games defined
by fine vectors is the unique mapping which satisfies Axiom System A.
Proof: We first prove that the solution mapping satisfies all axioms in the
Axiom System A. The axiom of Efficiency has been proved in Lemma 2.4.
Since
φ
pi(~f)
pi(i) (piv) =
∑
pi(S)⊆N,pi(S)3pi(i)
fpi(i)
f(pi(S))
cpivpi(S) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS = φ
~f
i (v),
we have the Pseudo-symmetry property.
For the dummy player, we have mi(T ) = v(i). To show the Dummy
Player property, let us recall the expression of the solution in Theorem 2.1
9
and the result of Lemma 2.2. We have
φ
~f
i =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T )mi(T ) = mi(T )
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi(T ) = mi(T ) = v(i).
Considering the linear combination representation of the unanimity games
for any game 〈N, v〉, we know cvS =
∑
T⊆S(−1)
s−tv(T ). So for fine games v
and u,
cv+uS =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−t(v + u)(T ) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−t
(
v(T ) + u(T )
)
=
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T ) +
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tu(T )
= cvS + c
u
S .
therefore φ
~f
i (v + u) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cv+uS =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
(
cvS + c
u
S
)
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS +
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cuS
= φ
~f
i (v) + φ
~f
i (u).
The Additivity property follows.
Let us turn to the unicity proof. We consider the solution of unanimity
games {uS
∣∣S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅}. If player i is not in S, then i is a dummy
player of the unanimity game uS , and uS(i) = 0. From Axiom 3, we know
φi(uS) = 0. Now, if pi is any permutation of N which carries S to itself, it
is clear that piuS = uS . Hence, by Axiom 2, φi(uS) : φj(uS) = fi : fj , where
fi : fj is the proportion. By Axiom 1 and the Dummy Player property, it
follows that
∑
i∈N φi(uS) =
∑
i∈S φi(uS) = 1. So, we have
φi(uS) =
fi∑
j∈S
fj
=
fi
f(S)
.
By the linear combination representation of the unanimity games for any
fine game
v =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
cvS · uS ,
and, by Axiom 4, we have
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
cvS · φi(uS) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
cvS ·
fi
f(S)
.
Remark 1 Theorem 3.1 means that the solution concept satisfies three of
the four axioms for the Shapley value, yet of course is not identical with
it. For obtaining the Shapley value we can add the Symmetry property.
For characterizing the Fine value we have introduced the Pseudo-symmetry
property.
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Choosing a reasonable fine vector means a good solution for a fine game.
How to choose the fine vector is very important for the solution mapping
Φ. For example, we can choose the number of times player i belongs to an
S with negative cvS . This determines a vector ~a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) and if
a =
∑n
i=1 ai, fi could be taken to be
ai
a
.
Following Example 1, the c-diagrams of its reward game and fine game
are
2
0 0 0
1 2 3
0
0
0 1 2
0 0 0
0
cr: −cf :
The Shapley value of the reward game is xr = (
5
3 ,
8
3 ,
11
3 ). We choose the
frequency based vector ~a as fine vector , i.e., ~f = (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2), so the solution
for the fine game is xf = (
1
3 ,
2
3 , 2). The solution of the original game is then
x = xr − xf = (
4
3 , 2,
5
3)
The Shapley value for the cf -diagram is (
1
2 , 1,
3
2) and the Shapley value
for the original game is therewith ( 76 ,
5
3 ,
13
6 ). We see that the fining procedure
gives a punishment to player 3, whose allocation goes from 136 to
5
3 . His loss
1
2 goes to player 1 :
1
6 and player 2 :
1
3 .
For a game in which a cost is to be shared, the c-diagram can be split into
two diagrams again, but the interpretation is then changing. The positive
cS ’s are now costs, resulting from joint activities, whereas the negative cS ’s
can be seen as savings on the costs, due to cooperation. The names cost
game and saving game are proposed. A Cost and Saving method exchanges
the ways of dealing with the two games, now the Shapley value seems fair for
the saving game, whereas the method used for the fine game might be chosen
for the cost game. After all, rewards and savings are typically cooperation
bonuses, whereas fines and costs are cooperation maluses.
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